Abstract-In this paper, a water distribution system (WDS), as an example of resource distribution problems, is investigated. To achieve an adequate level of service to satisfy the demands, the flow of water should be controlled. A novel game-theoretic approach is utilized to keep the WDS under control. The feedback interconnection of the WDS and the game-theoreticbased controller reaches an asymptotically stable equilibrium point where its stability analysis uses passivity concepts and the Lyapunov stability theorem for the closed-loop system. Moreover, a generalization to a class of distribution problem that maintains the same stability properties is provided. The effectiveness of the method is subsequently verified by simulations under different scenarios.
I. INTRODUCTION
Resource allocation management is a subject of growing concern all around the world. Resource distribution as a part of the resource management is used to assign certain amounts of resources to consumers in an economic and efficient way. However, the scarcity of the resources, efficiency and providing a satisfactory level of service are some of the existing constraints that make resource allocation problems challenging to deal with.
Management of water distribution networks has been one of the most important issues of concern in big cities. Fast growing population, scarcity of drinkable water, high costs of water treatments, etc. are difficulties that experts in the field of water supply are challenged by. Changes in water demand patterns, quality of service and different types of water consumption such as domestic, industrial, agricultural, etc. have resulted in research for finding and establishing the most suitable and reliable system that can adapt to several kinds of demands.
Literature review. Recently, there has been a considerable interest in designing optimal control strategies in resource allocation problems. For instance, in wireless communication networks, it has been tried to minimize the power consumption while customers are satisfied with service quality, usually defined based on signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] . It is assumed that the power is correlated with the SNR such that by increasing the power, the data transmission range will be extended but the noise level will also be higher [5] . The problem of power distribution is solved via convex optimization [6] , linear and non-linear programming [7] , [8] , by defining cost functions with respect to the power and SNR [9] , [10] . However, usually not all dynamics of the systems are considered, but only partial dynamics or functions linked to power and service quality.
On the other hand, in other areas such as [11] , [12] the authors consider the whole dynamics to observe the process of evolution in time of the systems. In these articles, the control of a water distribution network [13] is investigated and an evolutionary dynamics approach is employed not only to optimize the system, but also to stabilize it. Other examples of a game-theoretic approach for optimization are found in [14] , [15] , where the temperature control of a building is characterized.
The idea of controlling a WDS via evolutionary dynamics was first initiated by [11] , [12] . Prior to these studies, cost minimization of materials such as pipes, vales, tanks, etc. [16] , [17] or water production costs [18] , [19] have been considered, although, no rigorous mathematical proof has been provided. Therefore, the population dynamics approach along with an analytical study in [11] , [12] is a significant step in characterizing the WDS. In these papers, the Replicator Dynamic, which was first introduced by Taylor in [20] as one of the classes of evolutionary dynamics, is employed as a controller to stabilize and make the WDS converge to desirable equilibrium points.
Contributions. In this paper, we show that the Replicator Dynamic, under some conditions, converges to undesirable equilibrium points [21] and makes the WDS not function properly. In order to solve this problem, we propose other classes of well-behaved evolutionary dynamics, such as the BNN and the Smith dynamics [22] , [23] , [24] , that discard the undesirable equilibria. For these classes of evolutionary dynamics, we extend the existing convergence results in [12] to global asymptotic convergence. Moreover, by means of the ideas in [23] , we provide a generalization to a class of resource allocation problems to which the WDS is an example. In terms of stability analysis of the evolutionary dynamics, we follow similar methods utilized in [12] , [21] , [23] where passivity concepts and Lyapunov stability theorem [25] are employed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce some preliminary background material. In Section III, the problem statement along with a solution approach as well as the analysis is presented. In Section IV, a generalization to the system under study is provided. Then, simulation results followed by a conclusion are given in Sections V and VI.
II. BACKGROUND A. Stability and Passivity
Consider a dynamical system represented bẏ
where x ∈ X is the state, u ∈ U is the input, f : X ×U → R n is locally Lipschitz and h : X × U → R p is continuous with f (0, 0) = h(0, 0) = 0. We let X ⊂ R n and U ⊂ R p be the state space and the class of piecewise continuous inputs, respectively. The definition and the theorems below review passivity and Lyapunov stability. 
, then the system is lossless.
• u T y V , the system is called passive.
•
, where ϕ(x) > 0 ∀x = 0, the system is strictly passive. . Let x = 0 be an equilibrium point for the system in the form of (1) and X ⊂ R n be a domain containing x = 0. Let L : X → R be a continuously differentiable positive definite candidate Lyapunov function such that Figure 1 is strictly passive if H 1 and H 2 are strictly passive with the positive definite storage functions V 1 and V 2 , respectively. Moreover, for u = 0 the origin of the negative feedback interconnected system is asymptotically stable.
B. Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics
Consider a large population of decision-makers known as players/agents that are playing a game by selecting among several available choices called strategies, which are denoted by the set S = {1, . . . , N }. The simplex or the set of strategy distribution of the population can be defined as We generally identify a game with its payoff function. A payoff function f : ∆ → R N is a continuous mapping that assigns the population state a vector of payoffs. This means that each player gains a payoff by playing the strategies. We denote the vector of payoffs by
T where f i (p) is a continuous payoff function of playing the i-th strategy. To describe the optimality in the behavior of the players, as in [21] , we define the Nash equilibrium of a population game as a state where every utilized strategy earns the maximum payoff, i.e.,
Since every strategy receives the maximum possible payoff f max , for p ∈ NE(f ), we can write
In a population game, once in a while, the agents are given opportunities to change their choices. Each agent employs a revision protocol to switch to a better strategy. Revision protocols describe how and when the agents switch their strategies. Definition of the revision protocol, denoted by ρ(f, p), is presented in the following:
. The scalar protocol ρ ij is called the conditional switch rate from strategy i ∈ S to strategy j ∈ S given the population state p and the payoff vector f .
Considering the definition of the revision protocol, the following defines the mean dynamic of a population game:
The mean dynamic of the population game f is a set of ordinary differential equations, describing the evolution in time of the population state p under a given revision protocol ρ, that is shown bẏ
and, in general, is called the evolutionary dynamic.
Notice that on condition that V :
is Lipschitz continuous, existence and uniqueness of the solution to equation (4) follow from standard results found in [21] , [25] . Therefore, we ensure the Lipschitz continuity of V (f, p) by assuming that f and ρ are Lipschitz continuous.
That being the case, by considering the Definitions 2 and 3, one can conclude that the evolutionary dynamic is a mapping from the payoff function f to the population state of the game under which the mean dynamic is generated. As explained in detail in [22] , [23] , this closed loop is an inspiration to model it as a feedback interconnection of two input-output systems shown in Figure 1 , where H 1 and H 2 are the input-output models of the population game and the evolutionary dynamic, respectively. Next, an extension to this interconnection is provided.
C. Games with Dynamic Dependencies
Traditionally, we consider population games as memoryless mappings from the population state p to the payoffs f (p) where the payoffs are static functions [23] . From this viewpoint, agents can obtain their payoffs by substituting their current strategy selections in the payoff functions and by utilizing an appropriate revision protocol, they can form the corresponding evolutionary dynamic in order to analyze the evolution of the game they are playing.
In [22] , [23] , the authors extended these results to a more general class of games. As an extension from static games, they assumed that agents consider the games that have dynamics, which means that the games are being played through dynamical systems. They showed that in this setup, evolutionary dynamics act on dynamically modified payoffs instead of static payoff functions. This modification can be interpreted as a coupling between a set of evolutionary dynamics and a population game with dynamic dependencies.
In this configuration, dynamically modified games are mappings from strategy trajectories p(t) to payoff trajectories f (t) [23] . [23] .
where x(t) and f (x(t)) are the state vector and the payoff vector of the dynamically modified game, respectively. In other words, modified games can be written aṡ
where the Lipschitz continuous function F :
describes the dynamical model of the modified game. As a consequence of this modification, agents need to define their new payoff functions with respect to the dynamics of the game. In Section III, details of this connection with respect to the WDS are discussed.
III. WDS -MODELING / CONTROL PROBLEM

A. Water Distribution System
Here, by the motivation described in the previous section, we define the water distribution system as a population game with dynamic dependencies. As a typical example application, as in [12] , we consider the WDS that consists of a number of storage tanks and is employed to supply water. We presume that there exists a total input flow of water as the resource to fill the tanks with water. Thus, if we assign a certain portion of the total input flow to each tank, we can control the amount of water in the tanks.
We consider that a large number of artificial agents or players are supposed to take the responsibility of filling the tanks by allocating a certain amount of the resource to each tank. As an action set available to the population of agents, we assume that each tank is a possible choice for each agent. Therefore, if a player picks a tank, he dedicates a small portion of the resource to fill that tank. This means that the WDS is considered as a population game and the artificial players are to pick the tanks to fill as their strategies. We also assign a payoff to each tank, so the players can be attracted to fill the tanks.
A WDS, illustrated in Figure 6 , is used to supply water to all of its consumers and meet their demands. Suppose that there is a set of N different tanks for N consumers in the system where a total available flow of water, Q, should be allocated to the tanks. We denote the volume, input flow and the output flow of the i-th tank by v i , q in i and q out i , respectively. As explained in [12] , the change of volume in each tank with respect to time is simply given by
for i = 1, . . . , N . In order to control the WDS via evolutionary dynamics, we have to formulate the WDS as a population game with dynamic dependencies as well as a controller based on the mean dynamic of the corresponding game under a given revision protocol. We assume that each tank is equipped with a control valve at its input pipe. Since p i 's, which are the fractions of the agents selecting the tanks, are proportions between 0 and 1, they can be used as gates of the control valves to determine the percentage of how open or close the valves are to let water in the tanks. Therefore, the share of i-th tank will be
Now to model the output flow, for simplicity we assume that the tanks are being drained over the atmospheric pressure (gravity tank system [12] , [13] ), so the output flow, q out i , depends on the height of water, the transversal area of the tank and the output pipe, denoted by h i , S i and A i , respectively. Therefore, we can model the output flow of the i-th tank as follows:
where g is the acceleration due to the gravity, C i is the loss coefficient and v i = h i S i . Therefore, by using equations (6), (7) and (8), differential equations of the WDS dynamical model are given byv
The parameter c i = A i C i 2g/S i for each tank depends on its output pipe and the transversal area. Next, we introduce the Replicator Dynamic as a specified evolutionary dynamic to control the WDS.
B. System Controller
In order to analyze the behavior of the WDS by evolutionary dynamics, a payoff function should be associated with each tank. The authors in [12] considered the logistic type function (see [26] ) of form
where v mi is the maximum possible level of water in the i-th tank and r i is the maximum payoff that each strategy can get. In this configuration, the payoff function decreases as the volume of each tank gets closer to its maximum level, therefore, empty tanks are more attractive for the players. The first evolutionary dynamic with the following revision protocol prototype:
leads to the most studied evolutionary dynamic called the Replicator Dynamic [20] , [21] . By substituting this revision protocol in (4), the Replicator Dynamic takes the form oḟ
Consider the negative feedback interconnection of the tank system and the Replicator Dynamic in the form of Figure 1 , T . For simplicity, it is assumed that the maximum levels and the maximum payoffs of all tanks are equal, i.e., v mi = v m and r i = r. Therefore, by equations (9) and (12), differential equations become:
where i = 1, . . . , N . To calculate the equilibrium points v * i 's and p * i 's for the zero input interconnected system, we let the right hand side of the differential equations be zero, i.e.,
In equation (14), we can simply see that v * i 's are equal since
By summing the left hand side of (15) over i, we get
where (15), we obtain
The combination in equation (13) was first introduced in [12] where the authors used passivity concepts and the Lyapunov stability theorem to show the stability of the interconnection.
The Replicator model of the evolutionary dynamic is known to be the simplest to analyze and implement, however, it has a disadvantage which could cause some undesirable behaviors for the system. The problem occurs when the Replicator Dynamic admits non-Nash equilibrium points on the boundary of the simplex [21] . For instance, consider (19) which is not desired because the j-th tank is empty and by the definition, it is not a Nash equilibrium. In [21] , it has been explained in detail that the Replicator Dynamic does not satisfy the property of Nash Stationary -the NE's of a population game coincide with the equilibria of the corresponding evolutionary dynamic [27] -therefore, it can admit non-Nash equilibrium points. Also in terms of the stability analysis, it is shown in [12] that the Replicator Dynamic is lossless. Therefore, Theorem 2 is not applicable and asymptotic stability of the desired equilibrium is not guaranteed. Thus, in this paper, we utilize new sets of dynamics that are convergent only to the NE's to discard the undesirable equilibrium points. In the following discussion, adapted from [21] , [27] , two revision protocols that lead to different evolutionary dynamics are introduced:
1) Excess Payoff Target dynamic (EPT):
In this class of dynamics, switching agents only consider the difference between the payoff of a randomly selected strategy and the average payoff of the population. A prototype of this switching logic is the Brown-von Neumann-Nash (BNN) dynamic with the following revision protocol:
wheref j is called the excess payoff function. By substituting this type of revision protocol in equation (4), the BNN dynamic will be of forṁ
2) Pairwise Comparison dynamic: In this class, the difference between the payoffs of the current strategy and a randomly selected strategy is important to the agents. An example of this class that is called the Smith dynamic is:
where
is the revision protocol prototype.
Clearly, in the BNN and Smith dynamics, p i = 0 is not an equilibrium point. By choosing an arbitrary i and letting p i = 0, it can be seen thatṗ i , in (20) and (21), is not necessarily zero. Therefore, p i = 0 is not an equilibrium point.
C. Stability Analysis
In order to show the stability analysis of the game and the evolutionary dynamic that are introduced by the equations (9), (20) and (21), we utilize a new approach introduced in [23] , which, in general for the system of form (1), iṡ
where the input and output of u e and y e are the time derivatives of the original input and the output of the main system, respectively. These systems are called the Extended Systems [23] . Furthermore, for convenience in analyzing the system equations, we transform the equations into the error coordinates in the standard notation. To write the equations in the standard form, let
and to obtain the equations in the error coordinates, by considering equation (23), we write
So by the approach stated in equation (22), we construct the extended evolutionary dynamic and the WDS as the extended game dynamic by
Extended
Game Dynamic
. (26) Moreover, we impose the following domain:
to ensure that the system equations remain Lipschitz continuous throughout the following analyses.
In terms of the physical system, we can assume that an empty tank is unacceptable and should not happen. Therefore, we use a preventing mechanism to impose a safety margin to avoid empty tanks.
The following theorems show the passivity analysis of the extended systems:
Theorem 3. The extended water distribution system as the extended game dynamic, shown in equation (24), is strictly passive with the following positive definite storage function:
Theorem 4 ([21], [22] ). The extended BNN evolutionary dynamic, shown in equation (25) , is strictly passive with the following positive definite storage function: [24] ). The extended Smith evolutionary dynamic, shown in equation (26), is strictly passive with the following positive definite storage function:
The proofs of Theorems 3, 4 and 5 are omitted, see [23] . Now by considering a new storage function of form
where V 1 , V 2 and V 3 are defined in equations (28), (29) and (30), by Theorem 2, one can conclude that the negative feedback interconnection of the extended game dynamic and the extended evolutionary dynamic is strictly passive. Also, since the storage function V 1 is radially unbounded, by Theorem 1, the equilibrium point is globally asymptotically stable for zero input. Thus, V −1 new (0) that coincides with the NE of the underlying population game [21] is globally asymptotically stable.
IV. GENERALIZATION TO A CLASS OF AFFINE GAMES
In this section, a generalization to the class of population games with dynamic dependencies is presented. This generalized class of games admits the property of strict passivity and hence, by Theorem 2, its negative feedback interconnection with a set of strictly passive evolutionary dynamic, shown in Figure 1 , converges to the Nash equilibrium points of the game. Consider a dynamically modified population game, presented in Figure 5 and described by equation (5), that is being controlled in a feedback interconnection with a set of strictly passive evolutionary dynamics, given bẏ
where V (p, f ) can be either the extended BNN or Smith dynamics. In this configuration, x ∈ R N is the state vector of the game and p ∈ ∆ ⊂ R N is the population state. Since in a dynamically modified game, payoff functions are defined with respect to the game state vector [23] (i.e., f (x)), one can reconsider the notation of the evolutionary dynamic as follows:
If we model the dynamically modified game and the evolutionary dynamic, shown in equations (5) and (32), as the extended input-output systems of form (22), we arrive at Extended Modified Game :
Thus, we can utilize the configuration of Figure 5 and model the connection with a negative feedback interconnection of Figure 1 . The theorem below sums up the stability analysis of the feedback interconnection mentioned above.
Theorem 6. Suppose that a dynamically modified population game in the form of an extended input-output dynamical system is described by equation (33) where F : R N × ∆ → R N is Lipschitz continuous. The negative feedback interconnection of the modified population game with a set of strictly passive evolutionary dynamic described by equation (34) is strictly passive if
• F is strictly decreasing in x, and • F is linear and strictly increasing in p. Furthermore, for zero input, the origin of the feedback interconnected system is asymptotically stable.
Proof: The first condition of being strictly decreasing means that ∇ x F < 0 and the second condition says that there exists a constant symmetric positive definite matrix M such that ∇ p F = M > 0. Thus, we can represent this type of dynamically modified population game as
where g(x) is Lipschitz continuous and ∇ x g < 0. Therefore, if we consider the following storage function [23] :
it can be shown that the dynamically modified game is strictly passive, see [23] for details. Suppose we have a set of strictly passive evolutionary dynamic of form (34) such as the extended BNN or Smith dynamics. By Theorem 2, one can conclude that the negative feedback interconnection of this type of modified game and the corresponding evolutionary dynamic is strictly passive and for zero input, the origin is asymptotically stable. Moreover, if g(x) is radially unbounded in x, the storage function L is also unbounded and the system will be globally asymptotically stable. Theorem 6 is adapted from [23] where the smoothed payoffs are considered as the dynamically modified payoffs. The authors in [23] introduced a dynamical system to model and present the modified payoffs as a result of payoff smoothing. That system is defined aṡ
where λ, b > 0 and A < 0. It is shown that the system in the form of (37) is a strictly passive mapping from strategies to smoothed modified payoffs. However, in our system, dynamically modified payoffs are derived by defining the payoffs with respect to the existing dynamical model of the WDS in equation (10) . We have also reformulated and generalized this class of payoff modification in equation (35) where g(x) could be any decreasing function of the strategy trajectories. It is easy to show that the WDS could be described in this setup.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulation results. First, we show the problem of non-Nash convergence, which occurs by using the Replicator Dynamic. Then, under the same conditions, simulations of the BNN and Smith dynamics are illustrated. The parameters of the systems for three tanks [12] the Figures 7-8 , the Replicator Dynamic fails to bring the system to the desired equilibrium point because one of the tanks remains empty. Meanwhile, the BNN and the Smith dynamics have improved the WDS behavior in converging to the desired NE that are shown in equations (17) and (18) .
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the water distribution system as a straightforward example of a resource allocation problem. We utilized a novel game-theoretic approach to control and stabilize the WDS based on its consumers' demands. It was shown that the feedback interconnection of the WDS and the evolutionary dynamic controller converged to a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium point. Furthermore, we introduced a general class of distribution problems that maintained the same stability properties. Finally, we provided the simulation results that confirmed the theoretical results of this paper.
